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Securing Effective Regulation of the Shadow Banking System 
Agasha Mugasha1 
 
Shadow banking is here to stay. But it will be increasingly conducted in the full glare of the 
supervisory spotlight.2 
Abstract 
This article examines the recent regulatory reforms of the shadow banking system and why 
they were necessary.  Using securitisation, securities financing and money market funds as 
illustrations, the article concludes that the diverse and extensive new regulations on shadow 
banking are likely to succeed because they build upon some core principles that have been 
trialled elsewhere in the contemporary and wider financial regulation.  While those core 
principles extend the boundaries of conventional banking regulation, they aim to accomplish 
the same objective of financial stability.  Viewed in that light, the article concludes, the new 
regulations on shadow banking constitute an evolutionary positive step that fortifies the core 
principles of modern financial regulation. 
 
I. Introduction 
This article deals with the recent regulations designed to secure the stability and resilience of 
the shadow banking system.  It seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the subject by 
extracting the core principles from the extensive technical regulations and analysing the 
institutional and transactional context from which the regulations arose.  It notes that the most 
prominent legal issue in shadow banking, which is a deficit in the regulation of the systemic 
risk, has been tackled by comprehensive new regulations that, in effect, extend and further 
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refine the principles developed for the regulation of banking and other sectors of the financial 
industry. The principles of regulation canvassed in this article, such as the structural separation 
of financial institutions and functions, transparency, due diligence, risk retention and 
mitigation, and resolution and crisis management, are illustrative of the modern trend in 
financial regulation and are not restricted to shadow banking.  Viewed in that light, therefore, 
the regulation of shadow banking is evolutionary rather than transformative and reinforces the 
modern trends in wider financial regulation.  As will be explained further below in this 
introduction, this analysis provides an important new perspective, which places analysis of 
technical provisions in the context of broader principles in a manner that has not been done 
before. 
Banks are tightly regulated and supervised because they provide three critical services to 
society: they keep, lend, and move money. Technically speaking, they accept deposits, provide 
credit and operate the payment system.   They encounter many risks during their operations 
and hence the need for strict regulation to protect individuals and society. The general 
objectives of bank regulation are to foster a stable financial system, promote the safety and 
soundness of individual banks to protect deposits, and promote the conduct of banking business 
with integrity, prudence and professional skill.3 Banks are prudentially regulated and 
supervised to minimise bank failure because the cost to society at large would be extreme if a 
bank failed. Bank regulators also wish to reduce and minimise systemic risk as the difficulties 
experienced by one big institution could, through contagion, cause a run on other institutions. 
This could cause a constriction of liquidity for all sectors of the economy and reduce the overall 
level of economic activity.4  
The shadow banking system replicates the core banking functions of deposit-taking and 
lending and, thus, exposes the economy to the same financial stability risks.  Its constituent 
institutions and activities are also interconnected with banking raising the prospect of 
contagion.  Yet, before the global financial crisis of 2007-08 (sometimes referred to as 
“GFC”), the dominant conventional wisdom was that the activities and entities in the shadow 
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banking system – at the time, little understood and yet to be defined – did not pose a 
significant risk to financial stability and, in particular, any systemic risk.  Nevertheless, 
before the reforms, which are the subject of this paper, the significantly lighter regulation for 
shadow banks was a source of systemic risk; this was because the sector was teetering 
towards failure which, in turn, put banks at risk through contagion as the two sectors are 
interconnected. That, in turn, threatened the stability of the whole financial system. On taking 
stock after the global financial crisis, the regulatory concern was that, whereas shadow banks 
performed bank-like functions, they were not subject to similar prudential regulation and did 
not have the public safety nets in place that ensured there would be no undue risk to the wider 
financial system.5  
Shadow banking is the ‘the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and 
activities outside the regular banking system’6 or non-bank credit providers in short.7   The 
shadow banking system has existed alongside traditional banking for approximately four 
decades and it is neither shadowy nor nefarious, as the name might suggest.8 It simply 
consists of financial institutions and activities that provide bank-like activities – in particular, 
credit intermediation – and yet, they are not commercial banks. These include significant 
activities such as securities financing (repos and securities lending) and securitisation as well 
as key financial institutions such as money market funds, securities dealers/brokers, and 
finance companies. The well-known types of financial institutions of insurance companies, 
pension funds and public sector financial institutions are not shadow banks, but perform a 
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shadow banking function if they engage in commercial lending.  Investment banks, as well as 
commercial banks, may also conduct some of their business in the shadow banking system, 
but most are not generally classed as shadow banks themselves.9 In addition to the more 
established, pre-crisis, shadow banks, which were mainly dedicated arms of the institutional 
investors (pension funds, insurance companies) lending to companies directly and asset 
managers (mostly CLOs10), the newer shadow banks in the international financial markets are 
specialised funds (private debt funds, direct lending funds, listed funds, or partnerships 
between investors and banks) and they compete directly with, or complement, banks in direct 
lending.   
Shadow banking institutions and activities were implicated as significant contributors to the 
global financial crisis of 2007-08 because the losses occurring in hedge funds, money market 
funds, securitisation vehicles and conduits, broker-dealers/investment banks and repos 
cascaded into the mainstream banking system, leading to financial instability and great 
economic loss.11 The limited regulation then in place made shadow banks prone to significant 
financial stability risks that actually materialised through the run and liquidity squeeze. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, shadow banking was demonised for having large “negative 
stability effects” and adjudged as having had a “massively negative” net contribution to the 
economy.12 The reassessment of the value and safety of the shadow banking system that 
followed catapulted the sector near the very top of the political and financial reform agenda, 
whereby leading regulators across the globe sought to regulate the shadow banking system to 
reduce the vulnerability of the global financial system.  The earlier, but limited, literature, 
which was authored from the economics and finance perspectives mainly in the United 
States, pointed out the role played by specific subsectors of shadow banking (for instance, 
securitisation or securities financing) in the global financial crisis. The literature called for 
regulation of the sector, whose boundaries were not clear,13 with only a few dissents on both 
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its role in the crisis and need for regulation.  The dissenters argued that the financial crisis 
was caused by inadequate regulation14 and that further regulation was unnecessary.15  The 
scant legal literature briefly defined shadow banking, analysed the need and feasibility of 
regulating the sector, and reached two conclusions; firstly, that shadow banking should be 
regulated because it is a potential source of systemic risk or exacerbates financial crises and, 
secondly, financial regulators at the time (mainly in the US) lacked the legal authority for 
regulating it.16 Most of the preceding literature either focused on specific subsectors or 
analysed shadow banking holistically without drawing out the constituent elements and their 
linkages to other subsectors and the wider financial market, and there is virtually no literature 
on the regulation of the sector as a whole.  
This article analyses the recent improved and comprehensive regulatory framework for the 
shadow banking system and seeks to enhance understanding this field. While others have 
recognised the general need for regulation, and provided some useful, but rather technical 
commentary on the regulation of specific sub-sectors of shadow banking,17 this article 
analyses the financial stability risks in the constituent financial institutions and activities and 
extracts the overarching principles in the new regulations of the shadow banking system 
viewed holistically. So, the article makes the core argument that the package of new 
regulations on shadow banking, while adopting a different approach to the traditional legal 
regulation of mainstream banking, aim to achieve the same objective of financial stability and 
should be welcomed because they strike the right balance between stability and efficiency in 
the financial system.  The article further makes several important observations that expound 
on that core point.  First, the new regulations extend the boundaries of pre-existing shadow 
banking regulation on the one hand, and introduce further granularity in the regulation to take 
account of the economic reality that financial institutions sometimes do fail and that they do 
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require strict regulation.  Secondly, the new regulations start from the experience of failure in 
financial regulation and supervision – the global financial crisis – and seek to remedy past 
inadequacies in the regulatory and supervisory systems as well as financial institution 
practices.  Thirdly, whereas pre-financial crisis regulation was principle-based and light-
touch, the new regulations are detailed and intrusive.  Fourthly, whereas conventional legal 
regulation focussed on the earlier life of an institution, for instance, setting it up and 
operating it smoothly, and provided an exit avenue if the institution could not be operated 
effectively, the new regulations focus on the later stages in the life cycle of an institution; 
namely, its safety and resilience and, if need be, its terminal end without causing undue harm 
to the wider economy.   
The remainder of the article is divided in three main parts.  Part II analyses what the legal 
problem is with shadow banking; namely, a regulatory deficit that manifests itself in diverse 
complex financial transactions whose unifying factor is that they offer the bank-like service 
of credit intermediation.  This point is made by comparing the business of banking and its 
regulation, on the one hand; and the vulnerabilities caused to the financial system by shadow 
banking institutions and activities, on the other hand.   Part III briefly comments on the 
development of international policy on the shadow banking system before extracting the core 
principles that have emerged or become more prominent for the regulation of the shadow 
banking system.  The core principles illustrated include the structural separation of financial 
institutions and activities, heightened transparency and due diligence, risk retention and 
mitigation techniques, and resolution and crisis management.  The last part, the evaluation 
and conclusion, is broadly supportive of the regulatory reforms which, it notes, complement 
and fortify the broader principles of financial regulation and, for that reason, are likely to be 
effective for the regulation of shadow banking. 
 
II. The Regulatory Need to Contain Systemic Risk in the Shadow Banking System 
The key legal issue in the shadow banking debate is that it is comparatively less regulated 
than banking; and yet, it similarly generates systemic risk and, potentially, financial 
instability.  Until recently, it lacked the regulatory and supervisory safeguards that exist in the 
banking system and a regulatory gap still exists after the reforms.  Shadow banking should be 
regulated because, as a source of systemic risk, it can trigger a crisis or exacerbate an existing 
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one. Systemic risk, which is a risk of disruption in the financial system, with the potential of 
serious negative consequences for the financial system and the real economy,18 includes risks 
attributable to structural features of financial markets, such as connections between financial 
institutions, the distribution of risk within the financial sector, and unsustainable levels of 
leverage, debt or credit growth.19  The systemic risk in the shadow banking system arises due 
to five factors; first, some shadow banking institutions and activities perform the same 
economic functions that raise operational risks as in banking.  To illustrate, some shadow 
banking institutions, such as money market mutual funds, receive money from the public in 
much the same way as banks take deposits, and then on-lend that money which makes them 
susceptible to runs. Others, such as finance companies, provide credit while relying on short-
term funding that may dry up abruptly; while others, such as brokerage firms, deal with 
intermediaries reliant on short-term funding or funding secured on client assets that may be 
withdrawn at short notice. Furthermore, some shadow banking activities, such as 
securitisation, involve the long- term provision of credit, just like banks, or form chains that 
have fragile links.  Other activities, such as repos, recycle collateral, similar to banks20; and in 
all the above examples, institutions may overcommit, misjudge risk or take undue risk, thus 
presenting the same issues as in banking regulation.  Secondly, systemic risk arises because 
the sector is highly interconnected with the banking system and the wider financial system, 
which raises the spectre of contagion to the more prudentially regulated banking sector in the 
event of instability in the shadow banking system or an important institution or activity.21 
Thirdly, the sector is large and some of its individual components are large, making it 
systemically significant.   Fourthly, the shadow banking system is situated in the 
geographically sensitive jurisdictions of the United States, European Union and United 
Kingdom, with potential for global effect.  The United States has the largest shadow banking 
sector; this is because there is a wide variety of financial institutions and activities that 
regularly provide commercial and consumer credit, as compared with the United Kingdom, 
the euro area and most other countries where the banks are the main sources of credit.22  
Fifthly, the potential for systemic risk is amplified because of the global reach and complex 
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nature of its activities and institutions combined with the mobile nature of the securities and 
funds markets.23   
 In the immediate post-crisis period, there was a general need for regulation to restore 
confidence in the financial system and curb the excesses in the shadow banking system that 
arose from a combination of accelerating innovation on the part of the industry participants 
on the one hand and a light-touch approach to regulation on the other hand.  In the longer 
term, the regulations are necessary to maintain financial stability, ensure a level playing field 
with the banking sector, and reduce the likelihood of loss to the investors in shadow banks or 
the taxpayers who would be required to bail them out.  It is still important to maintain tight 
regulation years after the financial crisis ended because the shadow banking sector has grown 
in size and significance, and an anti-regulation stance has gained traction on both sides of the 
Atlantic, which signals the possibility of unwinding some of the reforms that brought stability 
to the wider financial sector.24   
A separate legal issue, which complicates the task of any coherent regulation, is that the 
parameters of the shadow banking system are not clearly demarcated, which makes a legal 
definition and attendant regulation complex.  Shadow banking is neither a distinct financial 
institution that can be regulated along institutional lines nor a distinct activity that can be 
regulated as such.  Rather, its diverse constituent elements use different methods (as will be 
explained below) and, yet, they should be regulated by the same principles because they 
perform a shadow banking function. 
A study on the regulation of shadow banking necessarily focuses on the large financial 
institutions and wholesale transactions that create systemic risk in the larger economies.  It 
does include the smaller credit providers and alternative digital channels that do not pose 
systemic risk even though they technically fall under the definition of shadow banking; such 
as such as peer-to-peer lending platforms, market place lending, online private placement, 
and invoice exchange markets.  It also excludes shadow banking in much of the developing 
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world, where, except in China, it is not a threat to financial stability as it is generally small 
and simple; in any case, it is closely monitored and supervised.25  
Shadow banking is a clear illustration of money moving out of the banking system to other 
financial institutions and activities and, logically, regulation should follow finance.  Since the 
business of banking has always been tightly regulated, it is an appropriate benchmark for the 
conceptualisation, policy formulation and regulatory design for a large segment of the shadow 
banking system.26  Furthermore, an illumination of the core banking functions and their 
regulation27 is critical to understanding what the regulation of shadow banking seeks to achieve 
and in the end, it will be shown that the two sets of regulation for the two sectors complement 
each other. 
 
i. Banking Business and Regulation – The Comparator for Shadow Banking 
The core economic role of commercial banks is credit intermediation and involves the two  
characteristics of accepting deposits on loan from the public by way of business and lending to 
households, firms and the wider financial system.28 The deposits are repayable on demand, or 
at some other agreed time; in the meantime, the banks use them for their own account.29 In 
their core role, banks perform the four economic functions of, first, maturity transformation – 
converting the short-term deposits to long-term loans, or what is sometimes known as 
borrowing short and lending long;30 second, liquidity transformation – using cash-like 
liabilities to buy harder assets such as loans; third, leverage – using borrowed funds (the 
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deposits) to increase profit by lending more money than the bank’s capital or asset base (also 
known as credit creation); and fourth, credit risk transfer – that is, transferring the risk of default 
from the bank to its debtors.31  These activities create a systemic risk to the financial system in 
cases where there is a mismatch between the bank’s assets and liabilities, hence the need for 
banking regulation. By parity of reasoning, shadow banking should be similarly regulated since 
it replicates the systemic risk inherent in the core banking business. 
The prudential regulation of banks focuses on protecting bank deposits so that customers do 
not lose their savings. The traditional approach to the prudential regulation of banks consisted 
of few requirements; namely, that a bank should be a body corporate or a partnership, should 
have its offices and close links with the United Kingdom for it to be effectively supervised, 
adequate resources to carry on its business, and employ competent and prudent management 
that should carry on banking business with integrity and in accordance with proper standards.32  
As a refinement to the traditional regulation of banking, starting notably around 1988, when 
the first global rules on capital adequacy took effect33 to the present time, modern banking 
regulation requires each bank to maintain sufficient capital as a buffer to external shocks by 
limiting the bank’s assets relative to its capital; to maintain sufficient liquidity so as to be able 
to accommodate new and existing customers with ease and convenience; to avoid excessive 
risk-taking by limiting the types of business it engages in (banks only deal in financial assets); 
and limit credit risk and concentration by restricting the size of loans to individual entities, 
related entities and the aggregate amount of loans.34 The requirements to employ people of 
high integrity and follow the principles of good business conduct are applied to a more exacting 
standard than applied previously.35  Bank regulators and supervisors also have a general power 
to impose more regulations to enhance the safety of the financial system.36 Prudential 
regulation is augmented by two important public safeguards that engender public confidence 
in the banking and wider financial system and, thus, minimise bank runs.37 The first of these 
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safeguards is the central bank liquidity provider of last resort, a safety net that can bail out a 
bank that has a temporary liquidity problem.38 The second safeguard is the industry-financed 
public guarantee scheme (of recent supplemented by bank special resolution schemes)39 
intended to ensure expeditious pay-outs to depositors, at least to a significant extent for most 
retail depositors, in case of bank failure.40 These tried and tested features of banking regulation 
require selective adaptation to achieve stability in shadow banking. 
ii. Shadow Banking Activity: Securitisation  
The well-established and highly beneficial technique of securitisation, where loans are 
packaged and then tranched into securities that are sold to investors, is a good illustration of 
the financial stability risks that arise from credit and maturity transformation, leverage, 
institutional linkages, and complexity and opaqueness of some transactions.41  The first step 
in a securitisation process is the origination of loans, where the loans are sourced by 
commercial banks (or finance companies, building societies and other mortgage originators). 
The bank then arranges to sell the loan to third parties, which frees up capital for further bank 
lending and creates the possibility of greater leverage in the economy.  In the second step, the 
pooling of loans, the sponsor, typically a subsidiary of a large commercial bank or an 
investment bank, purchases loans from one or more originators and packages them. Since this 
institution can, at times, be the same as the originator, this potentially creates a lack of 
transparency that has subsequently been a target for reforms. As a third step, the sponsor sells 
the pooled loans to the special purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a company or trust, which it 
would usually have created and would finally hold the loans. This again illustrates the 
interconnectedness among the originator and various securitisation entities, potentially 
creating a lack of transparency and liquidity and maturity transformation vulnerabilities in the 
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chain.  Fourthly, the SPV issues securities to investors against loans held on its portfolio. 
Usually, the SPV sells securities of the company (or the certificates of the trust) to the 
underwriter, which is generally an investment bank that, in turn, offers them up for sale either 
through a private placement or public offering to the ultimate investors.42 Notably, the 
underwriter can even retain some of these securities in its own portfolio.  The securities can 
also be repackaged in many ways or used as collateral for further loans at this point. Pre-
GFC, this stage of securitisation also included a wide variety of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, some of which were speculative and magnified risk, but post-GFC that has been 
significantly curtailed.43 While OTC derivatives and repackaging facilitate credit transactions 
and free up capital for further lending, they also increase leverage in the economy and 
potentially lead to financial instability.  The final stage is the purchase of the securities by the 
investors, who are then entitled to receive payments of principal and interest on the securities 
from the SPV in their order of priority, which is determined by the class or tranche of security 
certificates purchased. The ultimate investors, for example money market funds, hedge funds 
or institutional investors, can hold them on their balance sheet, sell them or even use them as 
collateral in a repo arrangement.44 Banks are closely linked with the investors because some 
asset management arms of banks invest in the securitisation market, while banks interface 
with other financial institutions through repo arrangements. 
The securitisation process transforms longer-term loans with significant credit risk into 
instruments of shorter maturity and considerably lower risk.  In so doing, the maturity 
transformation and credit intermediation process mimics the function of a bank which 
borrows short and lends long. That creates the financial stability risk of maturity mismatch.  
Securitisation also recycles funds for lending and makes more credit available in the same 
way as the banks function during the process of credit creation. The financial stability risk 
thereby created is the potential for excessive leverage.  Furthermore, nearly all the entities 
involved in a securitisation typically use a range of short-term instruments, like financial 
commercial paper and repo transactions, to fulfil their short-term funding requirements. Even 
the investors that buy the final securities, particularly money market funds, follow the 
business model of taking short-term investments to make long-term investments, which 
                                                          
42
 Accord. Securitisation Regulation, supra, article 2. 
43
 See, Securitisation Regulation article 24(12), id., and on derivatives generally, Vires Robbe, supra; Agasha 
Mugasha, The Secondary Market for Loan Syndications: Loan Trading, Credit Derivatives and Collateralised 
Debt obligations 19 Banking and Finance Law Review 199 – 235 (2004). 
44
 Repo is explained further below. 
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mimics the banking model.  The financial stability risks here include the interconnectedness 
of the financial institutions and maturity mismatch.  In conclusion, securitisation illustrates 
the numerous shadow banking institutions and activities as well as the linkages between 
banks and shadow banks, and that deterioration in either sector can spill over to the other. 
iii. Shadow Banking Institution - Money Market Funds 
Money market funds (MMFs) exemplify collective investment vehicles or alternative 
investment funds involved in credit intermediation.45 Their financial stability risks arise from 
their susceptibility to runs because of the credit and maturity transformation they perform, 
sometimes with leverage.46 Investors view MMFs as alternatives to bank deposits because they 
are generally perceived to be equally safe (technically, this is not entirely correct) and offer 
yields similar to money market instruments and, therefore, higher than bank deposits.  Another 
financial stability risk arises because MMFs are highly interconnected with the financial 
system, both on the deposit side – where they receive funds by way of investment from 
institutional investors, companies, and households – and on the supply side, where the large 
pool of funds can be deployed across the globe for a variety of purposes at short notice. They 
invest in highly liquid instruments such as financial commercial paper, treasury bills, short-
term fixed income securities and repo financing. They, therefore, have the beneficial effect of 
providing credit and liquidity across the global financial system; however, the sudden 
withdrawal of funds can cause a constriction of funding and a run on the financial system.47  
Yet, unlike bank deposits, MMFs until recently were neither subject to bank-like prudential 
regulation nor legally supported by either the central bank liquidity of last resort to stop runs 
or a public guarantee of investments that would compensate for investor losses.48 In recent 
years, however, before and after the financial crisis in Europe and the US, the industry was 
given access to the central bank facilities to stop runs and the disruption of the financial 
industry.49 
                                                          
45
 For their regulation, See Financial Conduct Authority, Handbook, COLL 5, implementing UCITS Directive 
2009/65/EC and /OIEC 2011/61/EU and AIFMD and Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (EU) 
2015/2365. 
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 Moloney, supra, at 260-263; Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, supra, 20. 
47
 Indeed, MMFs were considered to have spread the ‘credit crunch’ from the US to Europe in the recent 
financial crisis / credit crunch. 
48
 While the United Kingdom protects investors up to £50,000 under the Financial Services Compensation Fund, 
that is a pittance for institutional investors. 
49
 Tucker, supra, 2; International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Policy Recommendations 
for Money Market Funds, 6 http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD392.pdf. 
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The financial stability risks of MMFs, noted above, are inherent in the business model they 
adopt to attract investors but, at the same time, make them susceptible to runs.50 First, they 
promise instant liquidity; that is, the investment will be redeemed for cash on demand even 
before the underlying portfolio is sold. Secondly, they promise an enhanced return in line with 
market instruments; that is, to pay interest on the investment that is higher than what is 
obtainable on bank deposits – which can be challenging in a low-interest environment. Thirdly, 
they promise capital certainty; that is, the individual investor will get at least as much as they 
invested and that the principal value of the fund will be preserved and will not fall below par. 
This is the so-called Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV), which is similar to a bank deposit.51 
Technically, if the CNAV cannot be maintained above the threshold of 99.5 in the dollar, the 
fund must close for ‘breaking the buck’, thus incentivising a run.52 Because of these features, 
runs are an ever-present possibility and, occasionally, a practical reality because the value of 
the MMF, like other investments, fluctuates and may decrease. There have also been some 
structural issues that have been targeted by recent reforms. Pre-reform, there was a high level 
of interconnectedness with the banking industry for two reasons. First, the MMF industry 
provided funding across the financial sector, including short-term funding to banks,53 meaning 
that the maturity mismatch in the MMF industry could affect the banking sector and the 
financial system as a whole. 54 Secondly, as many as nine out of ten MMFs were sponsored by 
banks, meaning that banks faced the reputational risk of having to inject capital into MMFs in 
crisis, as happened during the financial crisis. And yet, pre-reform, banks were not required to 
hold capital against the implicit support for MMFs or consolidate them on their balance sheets. 
iv. Shadow Banking Activity - Securities Financing Transactions (Repos and Securities 
Lending) 
Securities financing transactions constitute short-term borrowing (or lending) using securities 
as collateral.55 They mainly consist of repurchase transactions for securities, commodities and 
                                                          
50
 IOSCO, Policy Recommendations, supra, Section 4. 
51
 Tucker, supra, 2. 
52
 IOSCO, Policy Recommendations, supra, Section 2. A run is also possible if the deposit side is unwilling to 
invest and investors redeem their investments at the same time. 
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 IOSCO, Policy Recommendations, supra, 18. 
54
 Tucker, supra, at 2. 
55
 For example, government bonds, mortgage securities, corporate debt and equities: see generally, Financial 
Conduct Authority Handbook, Stock Lending, COLL 5.4 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COLL/5/4.html. 
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guaranteed rights; lending and borrowing of securities and commodities; buy-sell back or sell-
back transactions; and any transaction having an equivalent effect.56 They are central to the 
wholesale funding system and the global financial system because financial institutions with 
excess capital get to the lend capital securely to those that need it under unique advantages 
deriving from law and practice that give similar protection to that of deposit insurance.  In 
particular, the transactions are short-term, over-collateralised, backed by reasonably liquid 
securities, subject to daily market valuation and re-margining requirements,57 and exempt from 
the automatic stay in insolvency proceedings.58 They thus add liquidity to the financial market, 
fund market participants, facilitate portfolio management and enable the monetary financing 
operations of central banks.59 
A repurchase transaction (repo) enables a financial institution (e.g. a bank) to borrow cash from 
cash-rich institutions such as central banks, pension funds, hedge funds and MMFs, using 
securities or other financial assets as collateral.60 Repo financing is driven by the short-term 
financing needs of banks and broker-dealers on the one hand, and the demand by some risk-
averse investors for collateralised money-like instruments on the other, such as very safe and 
highly liquid assets in the wholesale markets. Such institutions own cash that exceeds the 
amount protected by deposit insurance in a bank account, and yet they do not have access to 
the central bank lender of last resort that would guarantee them ready access to short-term 
funds. On the other hand, collateralised lending enables them to deploy funds for profit while 
maintaining ready access to their cash, similar to the central bank lender of last resort. 
The systemic risk in securities financing transactions is the potential for runs because the 
financial institutions reliant on short-term mail fail due to liquidity shortages.61 There is also a 
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 Financial Conduct Authority, Handbook, Stock Lending, COLL 5.4.2-5.4.3, id.; Article 3 of Regulation on 
Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions and of Reuse, Regulation(EU) 2015/2365; Benjamin and 
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 Financial Stability Board, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework 
for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks, 4-6 (29 August 2013) at http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130829b.pdf.; Bryceson, supra, at 41; Explanatory note to Securities Financing Transactions 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2365. 
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high level of interconnectedness among the participating institutions as well as several other 
specific financial stability issues. First, the transactions are usually complex and can be opaque 
for some market participants and regulators, especially because many are conducted off-
balance sheet without adequate disclosure. Secondly, collateral can by re-hypothecated or re-
used to support multiple transactions and, thus, creating excessive leverage.  Thirdly, the level 
of leverage may contribute to procyclicality, which is a strong positive correlation with existing 
market sentiment leading to excessive risk-taking in the financial system in a potentially 
destabilising way.62 Where a counterparty defaults, secured parties will sell collateral in a fire 
sale that may trigger a domino effect. Fourthly, the value of collateral and the ‘haircuts’ may 
also contribute to procyclicality. These issues have been the subject of reform, as discussed in 
the next section of this article. 
 
v. Observations on the Interface between Banking and Shadow Banking Risks 
As seen above, different components of the shadow banking system pose bank-like risks to the 
financial system even when they neither have public guarantees nor are they regulated like 
banks.  Securitisation, securities financing and money market funds are all susceptible to runs 
and interconnected with banks, raising the prospect of contagion.  Some of their methods are 
complex and opaque for regulators and investors alike, thus making for a strong argument in 
favour of supervisory oversight and regulation in proportion to the bank-like risks paused. The 
post-GFC reforms have progressively targeted the weak points in banking and shadow banking 
as seen next.  
 
III. Policy and Regulatory Interventions 
This section presents the core principles of financial regulation that have emerged or become 
more pronounced from the new and enhanced regulatory framework for the shadow banking 
system.   Viewed in isolation, the new and extensive regulations are transformational because 
they apply new rules to shadow banking; in wider context, however, the new regulations are 
evolutionary because they build on the recent, post-crisis, reforms of banking regulation, as 
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seen in Part II (a), above, and the regulation of the insurance industry, as noted in the 
following analysis.  Notably, the new regulations try to lessen the severity of a financial crisis 
in future and public bail-outs of financial institutions; they nonetheless still aim to achieve the 
same objective of financial stability.   
i. Global Coordination of Policy 
The policy for the regulation and supervision of shadow banking focuses on identifying the 
sources of systemic risk and the risk of financial instability generally. The regulators are keen 
to minimise runs on the financial market arising from credit institutions, activities that 
substantially rely on short-term funding, and entities with deposit-like characteristics.63 The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) took the lead in global policy formulation for certain areas 
and delegated some of the policy formulation to specialised agencies, while specific 
regulations and supervision were left to expert national regulators experienced in the sector. 
Notably, policy formulation in relation to money market funds and securities financing 
transactions was delegated to International Organisation of Securities Commissions, while 
capital requirements were delegated to the Bank for International Settlements. Whilst the 
‘soft’ law made by the FSB and other international standard-setting bodies is not legally 
enforceable, it is highly persuasive and often gets enacted in local legislation and enforced in 
the critical major jurisdictions for the financial sector. From a methodological perspective, 
the architects of the FSB measures do closely interact with those of the national jurisdictions 
through vertical and horizontal networks, thus giving the measures a high likelihood of being 
implemented across the globe.64 The complementarity between the FSB and national 
authorities is the new global regulatory order, with the resultant policy created at the supra-
national level by the G20 World leaders acting through the FSB.65   
The FSB and other national policy positions have been translated into specific laws that can 
be categorised under broad themes or core principles, as discussed below.  Some of the 
regulations have been directly applied to shadow banking institutions and activities, while 
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others were applied indirectly through the regulation of established financial institutions such 
as banks and insurance companies. 
ii. Core Principles in the Regulation of the Shadow Banking System 
The more stringent regulation of the shadow banking system is a subset of the significant 
financial reforms of the banking and wider financial industry regulations and is geared 
towards the resilience of the sector and greater financial stability.  The core principles or 
principal themes that emerged, which are analysed in this section are, therefore, distinctly 
similar to those found in the modern regulations applying to the wider financial sector.  
Concerning the financial stability of money market funds (MMFs), a global consensus has 
emerged that the regulations should seek to reduce systemic risk by promoting the resilience 
of MMFs and limiting contagion, particularly with banks.  In respect of securitisation, the 
reforms aim to reduce complexity and opaqueness in securitisation structures and linkages 
with banks.  Thus, the regulators across the globe have demanded enhanced transparency, 
stronger investor protection and significant risk retention requirements to deal with the risks 
generated by securitisation.  Concerning transactions in the securities financing market, the 
main aim for the global regulators is to reduce excessive leverage and dampen 
procyclicality.66  The reforms have been incremental and ever more comprehensive.  
The present analysis includes financial derivatives, which, while not being a credit facility, 
are used by virtually all types of financial institutions for hedging risk67 and, ultimately, do 
facilitate credit intermediation. The financial stability risks caused by financial derivatives in 
the lead-up to the GFC arose from their inherent attributes of increasing leverage in the 
financial system and creating linkages among financial institutions, both of which reached 
crisis levels because they went largely unnoticed in the predominantly OTC derivative market 
structure.68 Financial regulators were also concerned that the risk generated by financial 
derivatives was not properly assessed by some counterparties. The global regulators in the 
past minimally regulated derivatives on the premise that the sophisticated players involved in 
that market were better left to determine their legal relations; however, after the global 
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 Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013 – Executive Summary page 5 http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_131114.pdf. 
67
 See, e.g., Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (5th edition London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012). 
68
 Commission of the European Communities, Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets: Future 
Policy Actions para 1, COM (2009) 563/4 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/derivatives/20091020_563_en.pdf. 
 19 
 
financial crisis, in which financial derivatives were implicated in some of the high-profile 
financial collapses or near collapses of financial institutions,69 the same regulators favoured a 
paradigm shift towards closer regulation and supervision aimed at strengthening financial 
stability and making severe financial crises less likely in the future. 
1. Institutional reform 
While the structural separation of banking from other financial institutions and activities has 
always been a cornerstone of financial regulation,70 the new regulatory regime for the shadow 
banking system prominently extends that principle to stem the interconnectedness between 
shadow banking institutions and activities from mainstream banking.  The linkages between 
the two sectors, which may be explicit or implicit, have been addressed in many ways.  First, 
there are explicit legal bars to linkages among financial institutions, for instance the explicit 
requirement that an MMF shall not be externally supported by a bank or other external party.71  
Such support increases the prospect of contagion with the wider financial sector, and its 
discretionary nature increases uncertainty, which in turn, makes MMFs more vulnerable 
because market participants do not know if such support will be available when needed.  The 
new regulations, thus, are intended to reverse the pre-GFC institutional structure where as many 
as 90% of MMFs were owned by or sponsored by banks and is a clear effort at limiting 
contagion by separating MMFs from third parties.  
 
Secondly, in respect of securitisation, there is now a structural separation of retail and 
investment banking,72 which manifests itself in the significant restrictions on bank credit or 
liquidity support for securitisation vehicles and conduits.73 Thus, it is now required that banks 
and other mortgage originators shall only transfer the securitised exposures to special purpose 
vehicles and that the banks shall not maintain direct or indirect control over the securitised 
exposures.  Furthermore, the credit enhancement documentation must not require a bank to 
support the securitised exposures or investors. There must also be express prohibitions on any 
                                                          
69
 E.g. Bear Stearns, AIG and Lehman Brothers. 
70
 Notably, the separation of the businesses of banking, insurance and securities dealers. 
71
 Article 35, Regulation (EU) 2017/1131 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Money Market 
Funds. 
72
 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 Part 1 and Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Part 
9B Sections 142A-142G.  
73
 Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) which consists of Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU 
and Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013) and is applied by the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK. 
 20 
 
implied support by the bank beyond its contractual obligations and an express requirement that 
any such support can only be made at fair market value.74 
 
Thirdly, in respect of securities financing transactions and derivatives, the general trend 
towards the mandatory central clearing of transactions reduces interconnectedness among 
financial institutions and activities through the practicalities of the enhanced settlement 
processes.75 That is because each counterparty deals separately and settles its obligations with 
the central clearing party thereby avoiding exposure to multiple counterparties.76  Fourthly, the 
requirement for transparency in securities financing transactions and over-the-counter 
derivatives, appearing most prominently through the obligation to report to a registry and 
periodic reporting, implicitly reduces linkages among institutions.  All these structural reforms 
are complemented by principles of good governance and conduct of business rules aimed at 
enhancing financial stability by promoting the safety and soundness of financial institutions 
and instruments.77 
 
While these new rules on the separation of banking from shadow banking are rigorous and far-
reaching, in broader context they are merely steps along a continuum of modern post-crisis 
financial regulation.   
 
2. Accounting reform  
The key regulatory accounting reform restricts choice in the financial industry by generally 
preferring the market valuation of assets to reflect the actual risk in the economy. That 
reverses the hitherto prevailing liberal attitude that accommodated different valuation 
methods for financial assets and instruments, sometimes leading to different results.78  The 
change of principle and its consequences are illustrated in different ways. Before the financial 
crisis, MMFs promised that the investors would not incur loss even if the value of their 
investments fell and, officially, there was no public guarantee system, as existed for banks.  
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That was the effect of the constant net asset value (NAV) philosophy.  In reality, MMFs 
could not keep this commitment and were bailed out both in Europe and the US, thus landing 
the loss on the taxpayers.   The reforms require, therefore, the market valuation of MMF 
assets (mark-to-market), with only minor exceptions, thus prescribing the prevalence of 
floating/variable NAV, while significantly restricting constant NAV MMFs. That measure 
thereby apportions the risk to principal on the investors. Thus, a standard MMF shall not take 
the form of a constant NAV MMF.79  Furthermore, the assets of the MMF and the NAV in a 
constant NAV MMF must be valued at least daily using the market valuation method and the 
information published on the website.80  The same accounting approach can be seen in the 
valuation of derivatives in securitisation structures where there is a requirement to use market 
interest rates for any referenced payments.81  It can further be seen in respect of securitisation, 
where there is a requirement that risk management shall be based on economic substance 
rather than form.  Furthermore, the bank must calculate the risk-weighted exposure of its 
assets (the components of the calculation are highly prescribed82) and maintain regulatory 
capital commensurate with the risk it retains.83  Similarly, the new regulatory regime for 
insurance companies has also adopted a harmonised way for the valuation of assets and 
liabilities and directs that assets should be valued at market rates.84 As the banking and 
insurance examples illustrate, accounting reform is not confined to shadow banking but is 
part of wider financial reforms. 
3. Transparency and due diligence 
A key element of the regulatory reform that significantly strengthened the previous law on 
shadow banking consists of two complementary requirements of transparency and due 
diligence.  Transparency requires that information should flow to those who need it; namely, 
the regulators and investors; and due diligence requires investors and industry participants to 
do the best they reasonably can to protect their positions.  The two concepts address the 
concerns that in the lead up to the global financial crisis of 2008, crucial information about 
financial transactions had not reached the regulators and investors, and even when it did some 
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of it was too complex for both groups, in any event, the regulators adopted the light-touch 
regulation and did not use it.  On their part, the investors overly relied on credit rating 
agencies.   
In securitisations, the enhanced regime for transparency requires that the investors must be 
given access to all materially relevant information at the date of the securitisation and as 
circumstances warrant thereafter.  The information must include the credit quality, 
performance, cash flows and supporting collateral and such as other information as is necessary 
to conduct comprehensive and well informed stress tests on cash flows and the supporting 
collateral.85  Viewed in the more detailed European Union regulatory framework, each one of 
the originator, sponsor and SPV is required to make specified information available to holders 
of a securitisation position, potential investors and competent authorities and the information 
should be available in a timely and clear manner on a website that meets certain requirements.86   
For instance, the investor, before investment, shall be given data on static and dynamic 
historical default and loss performance for substantially similar exposures to those being 
securitised for a period of at least five years. Secondly, prior to issuance, there must be external 
verification of a sample of underlying exposures, including verification that data is accurate 
with a confidence level of 95%. Thirdly, the originator or sponsor must provide the investors 
with a cash flow model before pricing of the securitisation and on an ongoing basis; and the 
originator, sponsor and SSPE must comply with the transparency requirements.87  An 
institutional investor, on its part, is required to carry out due diligence assessments 
commensurate with the risks involved in a securitisation before it becomes exposed to a 
securitisation, and regularly and continuously after taking an exposure.88 
 
In securities financing transactions (SFTs), the enhanced transparency requirement is intended 
to enable to identify and monitor the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system89 and in 
particular to detect and limit excessive leverage and the risks arising from the linkages among 
institutions.90  Thus, a counterparty to an SFT transaction is required to report the details of 
such transaction to a trade repository which is registered or recognised no later than the working 
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day following the conclusion, modification or termination of the transaction.91  A counterparty 
is required to keep a record of any SFT for at least five years following the termination of the 
transaction.92 To ensure data transparency and availability, a trade repository is required 
regularly and in an accessible way to publish aggregate positions by type of SFTs reported to 
it. This would ensure direct and immediate access by the regulators to enable them to fulfil 
their regulatory and supervisory responsibilities and mandates.93  The second requirement for 
transparency is directed at the investment funds, in the present instance money market funds, 
which are required to protect investors whose assets are used in SFTs. It addresses concerns 
that the owners of collateral and other securities were not fully aware of, or had not consented 
to, the risks that they were exposed to when financial institutions engaged in STFs. Now, the 
managers of money market funds are required to make detailed disclosures to investors in pre-
contractual documents, for example prospectus and equivalent documents to investors, and in 
periodic reports on the use they make of SFTs, total return swaps and other financial structures 
having equivalent effect.94  
 
In respect of OTC financial derivatives, the new regulations seek to enhance transparency so 
that the regulators have an overview of the derivatives market and can monitor risk and 
intervene to reduce systemic failure. The regulations address the past systemic risk problem 
that derivatives lacked transparency of prices, transactions and positions and thereby created 
difficulties for both participants and regulators.  They focus on achieving heightened 
transparency in the market using trade repositories and trading venues.95  All standardised 
derivatives are required to be traded on organised markets and, as much as possible, all other 
derivatives should be traded on a trading venue, which is a system or platform operated by an 
authorised investment firm or regulated exchange that brings together buyers and sellers of 
interests in financial instruments, including derivatives.96   There is, in addition, a mandatory 
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reporting requirement.  Counterparties and Central Clearing Parties (CCPs)97 shall ensure that 
the details of any executed, modified or terminated contract are reported to a trade repository 
or home regulator (Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), in the UK) no later than the working 
day following the conclusion, modification or termination of the contract.98 In turn, trade 
repositories must report to the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) or the FCA,99 
which monitors the wider sector. 
By way of comparison with banking, transparency is a well-established regulatory and 
supervisory requirement that has been re-emphasised after the global financial crisis.  In 
banking, for instance, the relevant bank supervisor is required to determine that “banks and 
banking groups regularly publish information on a consolidated and, where appropriate, solo 
basis that is easily accessible and fairly reflects their financial condition, performance, risk 
exposures, risk management strategies and corporate governance policies and processes”. 100 
By way of further comparison with the regulation of insurance companies, disclosure and 
transparency constitute the third pillar of the modern regulatory regime (the other two being 
financial requirements and governance and supervision) and it requires insurers to publish 
details of the risks facing them, their capital structure, solvency and risk management.101  
Such disclosure and transparency, both to the public and regulators, is intended to foster 
greater market discipline on the insurers, enable early intervention by the regulators where 
necessary, and increase competition.102  Thus, the regulations on shadow banking mirror 
those in mainstream banking and insurance and, therefore, form part of a wider financial 
regulatory framework. 
4. Capital and liquidity requirements  
The recent reforms further tighten and add detail to the already stringent financial 
requirements on money market funds by specifying the permissible investments and 
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maximum investment limits.103  They emphasise the accurate valuation of assets, easy 
disposal and spreading of risk. MMFs, like other collective investment schemes, should hold 
a minimum amount of liquid assets to fortify themselves against massive redemptions and 
prevent fire sales, periodically conduct appropriate stress testing, and have tools to deal with 
exceptional market conditions and substantial redemption pressures. 104 There are significant 
restrictions on portfolio holdings in a bid to enhance liquidity and asset quality, requirements 
for the avoidance excessive concentrations of investments in one issuer or related group of 
issuers, and limitations on the aggregate exposures to particular types of investments.105 The 
assets of the MMF must be transferable, mature in the short term (up to two years), and be of 
high credit quality.106 The high quality of eligible assets must be established by a prudent and 
rigorous internal credit quality assessment procedure and must avoid a mechanistic reliance 
on credit rating agencies.107   
This approach is similar to the approaches adopted in the regulation of banks, investment 
firms and insurance companies; the principles of financial regulation are, therefore, the same, 
but operate in different contexts.  As briefly noted above in Part II (a), capital adequacy is a 
central tenet in the prudential regulation of banking and investment firms and the regulations 
have become more restrictive on the quality and quantity of bank assets in relation to capital.  
Furthermore, bank regulation requires the avoidance of concentrations of risk and large 
exposures to a single entity or related entities.108  As noted succinctly by the Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision, the relevant bank supervisor “sets prudent and appropriate 
capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks undertaken by, and presented 
by, a bank in the context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it 
operates.”109  Furthermore, the relevant supervisor “determines that banks have adequate 
policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate 
concentrations of risk on a timely basis”110.  Similarly, insurance companies are required to 
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hold minimum capital levels backing their operations and must regularly report to supervisors 
on their portfolios.111  There are limitations on their investments because insurance 
companies are only permitted to invest in assets whose risks they can properly identify, measure, 
monitor, manage, control and report, and appropriately take into account in the assessment of their overall 
solvency.112   Capital calculations are highly prescribed113 and insurance supervisors are 
required to intervene and require remedial action if that capital falls below required 
thresholds114 or there is excessive concentration of risk.115   
5. Risk retention and mitigation 
The reduction of systemic risk is at the centre of all the regulatory reforms of the shadow 
banking system and in the pre-crisis years, there were many sources for such risk; for 
example, some market participants did not retain sufficient economic interest in the products 
they created and thus did not have on-going interest in their success, some did not evaluate 
risk properly, while others did not take sufficient risk-mitigation techniques.  Post-GFC, 
many of the measures adopted introduced further granulity in the regulations such as risk 
awareness, calculation, mitigation and avoidance.  In securitisations, several risk retention 
rules must be complied with.  The originator, sponsor or original lender is required to 
maintain, on an ongoing basis, a material net economic interest in the securitisation of at least 
5%. Where those three institutions cannot agree on whom to retain the interest, it shall be 
retained by the originator. The net material economic interest need only be retained by one 
type of retainer and cannot be split among them, and an entity that has been established or 
operates for the sole purpose of securitising exposures is not considered as an originator.116 
That risk retention obligation is in addition to the due diligence obligation on the part of the 
investor to ensure that the retention obligation is being met.117  Furthermore, the interest and 
currency risks in the securitisation must be mitigated and the mitigation measures 
disclosed.118  
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The principle of risk mitigation in money market funds has led to further tightening 
prudential regulation by focusing on the avoidance of illiquidity and concurrent large 
redemptions.  One approach to this is through the requirement for the diversification of 
investments.  Thus, there are specific limitations on the types of assets in which the MMFs 
could invest and the risks they may take, which are principally limited to liquid, short-term 
financial instruments.119  Prudent risk management also requires that MMFs must regularly 
conduct stress testing120 and know their investors so that they are able to anticipate concurrent 
redemptions.121  Furthermore, liquidity fees and suspension gates have been introduced as 
new safeguards to stem massive, sudden and concurrent investor redemptions.122 To 
illustrate, whenever weekly maturing assets fall below 30% or net daily redemptions on a 
single day exceed 10%, the board of the constant NAV MMF may apply one or more of (i) 
liquidity fees of up to 2% on redemptions, (ii) redemption gates limiting any one dealing to a 
maximum of 10% of shares or units in the MMF, or suspension of redemptions for up to 15 
days. Liquidity fees and/or redemption gates must be applied if weekly maturing assets fall 
below 10%.  
The Regulatory Reform to reduce systemic risk in OTC Derivatives has introduced further 
granulity in the regulations concerning risk awareness, monitoring, quantification and 
mitigation.  The first regulatory measure addresses the systemic risk problem that some 
participants in the derivatives market did not price counterparty risk correctly. Counterparty 
risk been addressed by imposing the obligation of mandatory central clearing for all eligible 
OTC contracts, and similar measures for bilateral clearing.123  Central clearing is a risk-
mitigation technique since the central clearing party (CCP) interposes itself between each 
buyer and seller, becoming a party to each contract, and by “establishing positions, including 
the calculation of net obligations, and ensuring that there is adequate collateral for the parties’ 
respective obligations.124  The enumerated categories of eligible derivatives are broad in 
scope125 and can be expanded having regard to the need to mitigate systemic risk.  A 
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‘financial counterparty’, to whom the requirement applies, is broadly defined to capture credit 
institutions including banks, insurance and reinsurance companies, investment firms, 
registered UCITS funds, pension funds and alternative investment fund managers;126 in other 
words, many of the financial institutions routinely involved in the shadow banking sector.  
Even if an OTC contract is considered ineligible for clearing, the OTC Regulation requires 
financial counterparties, by exercising due diligence, to apply the risk management 
techniques of measuring, monitoring and mitigating operational risk and counterparty credit 
risk. The techniques include the utilisation of electronic or other timely confirmation, 
portfolio evaluation and reconciliation, daily mark-to-market, segregation of collateral and 
the holding of capital.127  The second measure targets operational risk, which is a   sub-
category of systemic risk; that is, the loss attributable to inadequate or failed internal 
processes, or from external events including legal risk.128  Operational risk is reduced by 
moving from a predominantly custom-made, over-the-counter (OTC) market to standardised 
contracts, together with other developments in industry practices, particularly the move 
towards electronic trading, central clearing, reporting to a trade repository, and legal reform. 
By quick analogy with banking regulation, banks are required to have adequate risk 
management processes addressing market, liquidity and operational risk.129  They should also 
have policies and processes for the early identification and management of problem assets.  
Furthermore, they should maintain adequate provisions and reserves.130  Similarly, insurance 
companies are required to have effective systems of governance that provide for sound and 
prudent management of their business.131  They are also required to have adequate risk 
management policies, techniques and reporting procedures to identify and monitor the risks 
to which they may be exposed including their own risk and solvency assessment.132  
Furthermore, insurance supervisors, on their part, have powers of to verify systems of 
governance,  evaluate risks  and to require that systems of governance be improved and 
strengthened.133  Drawing from the banking and insurance industries, the principles of risk 
mitigation and retention that have been applied to the new shadow banking sector are, 
                                                          
126
 European Markets and Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Article 2(8). 
127
 Id., Article 11. 
128
 See e.g. Ensuring Efficient, Safe and Sound Derivatives Markets: Future Policy Actions, para 4 
129
 See, e.g., Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013) chapter 4 on credit risk mitigation. 
130
 See, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, supra, Principles 18, 22, 24 and 25. 
131
 Solvency II Directive, Article 41.  
132
 Solvency II Directive, Article 45. 
133
 Solvency II Directive, Article 41(5). 
 29 
 
therefore, part of a wider principle of risk management through and in turn part of the 
overarching principles of financial regulation. 
6. Resolution and crisis management  
A novelty of recent financial reform tackles the issue of a failing financial institution that is 
bailed out, as some mutual funds and banks recently were, thus burdening the taxpayers and 
impacting on the wider economy.  Policy makers have made it a priority to reduce taxpayer 
bailouts and minimise disruptions to the wider economy caused by failing large financial 
institutions.  The resolution and crisis management regime, colloquially known as the ‘living 
will” requirement,134 and best known in banking because banks were the largest causalities in 
the financial crisis, requires a systemically important bank (or other financial institution) to 
have a bespoke credible and detailed plan for its easy winding up on the advent of trouble or 
ring-fencing the troubled parts without causing harm to the depositors or the global financial 
system and without relying on a government (or taxpayer) bailout.135    In MMFs, the 
resolution and recovery concept is applied indirectly in what is probably the most 
fundamental reform, seen above, which is the requirement that most money market funds 
move from a constant value net asset valuation to a floating value net asset valuation.   That 
requirement directly places the risk of loss on the investor and, thus, significantly relieves the 
pressure for fund bailout. There are complementary provisions that clearly shift the risk of 
loss to the investor; such as requiring every MMF to indicate on every external document the 
specific type of MMF it is, that it is not a guaranteed investment, that the principal investment 
is capable of fluctuation, that it does not rely on external support for guaranteeing liquidity or 
stabilising the NAV, and that the investor bears the risk of loss to the principal.136  The new 
requirements for redemption gates and fees, seen above, constitute a part of crisis 
management. 
7. Observations on Regulatory Reform 
The reform of shadow banking has been both macro and micro-prudential on the one hand, and 
domestic, regional and international on the other hand. The first comprehensive phase has been 
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completed and its themes comport with the contemporary themes of financial regulation.  
Notably, it is a sequel to the regulation of banking where there is an institutional structure and 
an immense body of regulations for identifying and reducing systemic risk,137 promoting the 
safety and soundness of the financial system,138 and ensuring that financial institutions follow 
principles of good business conduct.139  Even novel ideas in shadow banking regulation, such 
as the living will and ring-fencing have been trailed in banking regulation.140   
 
 
IV. Evaluation and Conclusion 
 
Shadow banking was ushered on the global stage amidst negative publicity and ambiguity of 
its constituent elements, but has since become amenable to a fairly precise definition and 
recognised as a separate sector in the financial system complementary to banking, capital 
markets and the generic ‘other financial institutions’. As seen above, it consists of non-bank 
credit provision or “alternative lending” offered by well-established financial institutions and 
activities as well as new participants.  We specifically analysed money market funds, 
securitisation, and securities financing transactions.   
This article applauds the core principles in the new regulations on the shadow banking system 
as the optimal solution to securing the effective regulation of an important component of the 
financial system, for two reasons. First, the process that led to their creation was consultative 
and international; led by the Financial Stability Board in developing global policy141 and, 
subsequently, adopting a consultative approach in developing the implementing legislation in 
the United Kingdom. Secondly, the new regulations substantively conform to contemporary 
global themes for risk reduction in the wider financial regulation, such as improving the quality 
and quantity of capital in the financial system, the market valuation of financial assets, 
increased transparency and due diligence concerning transactions, arm’s-length operations 
among financial institutions, central clearing and standardisation of securities, easy winding up 
of a failing financial institution, and stringent organisational and business conduct standards 
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among financial institutions.142  The recent regulations are comprehensive and diverse because 
the shadow banking sector is an aggregation of different institutions and activities, even though, 
ultimately, the activities are carried out by institutions.   
As seen above, the legal discourse about shadow banking is essentially about the regulations 
necessary for the reduction of systemic risk in the financial market.  Generally, financial 
regulation aims to maximise efficiency, minimise risk and reduce regulatory arbitrage.143  The 
efficiency of shadow banking lies in its disintermediation of finance outside the traditional 
banking system that enhances consumer welfare by providing more products to more people at 
greater speed and lower cost.144 This is achieved through a number of positive economic 
functions, namely collective fund management, direct loan provision, secured financial 
transactions based on financial collateral, and securitisation.145 On the efficiency score, then, 
the global financial community needs a robust and resilient shadow banking sector.  The 
primary risk of shadow banking is systemic risk arising from a whole array of factors, such as 
maturity and liquidity transformation, leverage, imperfect credit risk transfer and regulatory 
arbitrage.  More simply, as seen above, shadow banking is a potential source of financial 
instability because it serves the same functions and is interconnected with banking. Regulatory 
arbitrage undermines the benefits of financial regulation when tighter regulation causes an 
activity to shift to less regulated entities or jurisdictions.146  Thus, this article has welcomed the 
more stringent regulation of shadow banking to reduce the risks to financial stability or the 
potential to exploit regulatory arbitrage. The article, therefore, aligns to the consensus that 
shadow banking should be regulated at an appropriately calibrated level that is not so stringent 
as to cause business and risk to migrate elsewhere.147  
As noted in part III (a) above, the policy formulation that preceded the detailed regulations on 
shadow banking was spearheaded by the Financial Stability Board, which coordinated other 
standard-setting bodies and national authorities within its mandate of global financial reform. 
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While the ideological bent of the most advanced economies and financial markets that 
constitute the G20 is towards the facilitation of competition, it has been acknowledged that in 
the sphere of financial regulation regulatory competition leads to the negative effects of 
arbitrage, information asymmetry, duplication of rules and a reduced quality of regulatory 
intervention; this is because jurisdictions that have less intrusive regulations or enforcement 
gain at the expense of the more rigorous regulators or enforcers.148 In contrast, coordination 
promotes efficient capital markets and usually leads to standardisation which, in turn, leads to 
substantive convergence and the facilitation of market behaviour, even though it might 
restrict innovation.149 That explains the similarity of the national regulations on key shadow 
banking components across major jurisdictions.150 
Remarkably, shadow banking does not raise new theories to regulation; rather, it presents a 
new sphere for the application of regulatory techniques that have been trailed and tested in 
the banking, securities and other financial sectors. This is partly because the reform of 
shadow banking regulation is part of the significant financial reforms of the banking and 
wider financial industry and is similarly geared towards greater financial stability and the 
resilience of the sector.  It is also because, pre-reform, there was significant interface between 
banking and shadow banking risks that necessitated similar responses.  That interface was 
illustrated throughout part II, above.  First, both banking and shadow banking used funding 
methods that involve maturity and liquidity transformation and, thus, were susceptible to 
runs. Secondly, the linkages between their business activities, exacerbated by a lack of 
transparency, led to potential spill-overs from shadow banks to banks and vice versa.  Those 
linkages caused a build-up of systemic risk indirectly via credit intermediation chains, 
meaning that problems in the unregulated or lightly regulated system could easily spread to 
the traditional banking system.151 Thirdly, shadow banks were amenable to high levels of 
leverage characterised by high debt-to-equity ratios and little liquidity relative to the assets 
available to settle immediate claims. High leverage, which may not be readily apparent to the 
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investors and regulators, magnifies profits during boom times and exacerbates losses during 
downtowns, thus increasing pro-cyclical risks.152 Since shadow banking institutions were 
generally less regulated than banks, they could engage in higher-risk activities or over-
commit themselves than would be permitted for banks.153  Fourthly, some shadow banking 
used some risky business models that were more tightly controlled in traditional banking. For 
instance, some structured investment vehicles and other off-balance-sheet vehicles confined 
their borrowing by relying on statutory exemptions; for that reason, the borrowing was 
unregulated and not subject to prudential requirements.  The issues were, therefore, similar to 
those encountered in banking if it were not for its tighter regulation. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the regulation of shadow banking has a distinctly similar flavour to 
banking regulation, tempered only by a couple of factors.  First, banking regulation focuses on 
the protection of depositors and, yet, there are no depositors in the shadow banking system.  
Logically, therefore, the regulation of shadow banking should not include the elements aimed 
at the protection of depositors such as a public guarantee scheme.  Secondly, shadow banking 
regulation, born of the global financial crisis, principally aims to avert future crises or lessening 
their impact on the economy.  It therefore focuses on the mid- and tail- end stages in the life 
cycle of a financial institution or activity, whereas the conventional regulation of banking 
focused on the earlier stages in the life cycle of a bank; that is, setting it up and ensuring that it 
operated effectively in the economy.  Nevertheless, there is remarkable similarity in the core 
themes for the post-crisis regulation of banking and the regulation of shadow banking because 
both sets of regulation have the same objectives.   
This article has, coincidentally, exposed the limits of legal regulation because some 
significant issues in shadow banking are economic rather than legal; for example, identifying 
the parameters of the shadow banking system and the calculation of the risks it generates. 
These economic realities do influence the crafting of legal regulations to the sector and any 
new reforms. It is still fair to say, though, that the initial period of policy formulation and 
regulation of the shadow banking system was a reaction to the global financial crisis, 
whereby the bias was clearly on prudence aimed principally at financial stability and the 
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restoration of confidence in the financial system. As the first reaction to the raw memory of 
the global financial crisis, the new regulations were pitched close to the ideal solutions. The 
subsequent period has seen an increased focus on the social usefulness of shadow banking 
and a review of possible overreach or unintended consequences.  It is suggested that any 
problems could be fixed by adjustments within the core principles for maintaining financial 
stability.      
A stable and robust financial system requires continuous reforms at a pace that does not detract 
from certainty for financial transactions. Shadow banking is here to stay; it is an essential 
component of the economy and the global regulators are well-equipped to deal with it as a new 
sector of the financial industry. The Financial Stability Board and the global financial 
community have crafted an appropriate policy framework and a suitable approach to regulation 
and supervision of shadow banking; however, strict regulation makes a fertile ground for 
innovations that thwart the existing framework, hence the need for continuous refinement. A 
flexible approach focusing on the complementary goals of reducing systemic risk and 
promoting financial stability is required from the regulators to keep shadow banking beneficial 
and under supervisory oversight.  
 
 
 
